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Should Corporations Have a Purpose?
Jill E. Fisch and Steven Davidoff Solomon*
Corporate purpose is the hot topic in corporate governance. Critics are
calling for corporations to shift their purpose away from shareholder value as a
means of addressing climate change, equity and inclusion, and other social
values. We argue that this debate has overlooked the critical predicate questions
of whether a corporation should have a purpose at all and, if so, what role it
serves.
We start by exploring and rejecting historical, doctrinal, and theoretical
bases for corporate purpose. We challenge the premise that purpose can serve a
useful function either as a legal constraint on managerial discretion or as a tool
to promote the interests of stakeholders over those of shareholders.
Instead, we identify an instrumental function for corporate purpose.
Because a corporation consists of a variety of constituencies with differing
interests and objectives, an articulated, measurable, and enforceable corporate
purpose enables those constituencies both to select those corporations with
which they wish to identify and to navigate the terms of that association through
contract or regulation. We highlight the role of purpose in enabling a
corporation to commit to core policies of its business model and for which the
corporation has a comparative advantage. Critically, our instrumental view
highlights the role of purpose as a voluntary tool to facilitate the goals of
corporate participants rather than a regulatory instrument to promote specific
public policies.

Introduction
Purpose is the hot topic in corporate governance. Not only are
commentators demanding that corporations formally articulate a purpose,
they are insisting that corporate purpose encompass the interests of
nonshareholder stakeholders or society more generally.1 In August 2019, the

* Jill E. Fisch is the Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of Business Law at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School; Steven Davidoff Solomon is Professor of Law at the University of
California, Berkeley, School of Law. We thank participants at the 2020 BYU Winter Deals
Conference, the Harvard Law & Economics workshop, the Stanford Law & Economics workshop,
the Duke University School of Law faculty workshop, and the University of Pennsylvania Law
School faculty ad hoc, and Richard Buxbaum, Amelia Miazad, Elizabeth Pollman, and Asaf Raz
for their helpful comments and suggestions.
1. See, e.g., COLIN MAYER, PROSPERITY: BETTER BUSINESS MAKES THE GREATER GOOD 22,
24 (2018) (proposing that corporations be legally required to articulate a purpose).

FISCH.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

1310

7/18/2021 6:00 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 99:1309

Business Roundtable made international headlines2 when it replaced its
support for shareholder primacy with the proposition that corporations be run
for the “benefit of all stakeholders[—]customers, employees, suppliers,
communities and shareholders.”3 BlackRock CEO Larry Fink has stated that,
“Without a sense of purpose, no company, either public or private, can
achieve its full potential.”4
The shift is more than semantic.5 The debate over corporate purpose is
part of a broader effort to reorient corporate decision-making away from
economic value maximization in favor of broader societal objectives, not
simply as a choice, but as an affirmative obligation.6 Senator Elizabeth
Warren introduced legislation that would require corporations to be run for
the benefit of constituencies with mandatory employee representation on the
board.7 Corporations themselves are increasingly laying claim to

2. E.g., Richard Henderson & Patrick Temple-West, Group of US Corporate Leaders Ditch
Shareholder-First Mantra, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/e21a9fac-c1f511e9-a8e9-296ca66511c9 [https://perma.cc/Y8H4-CTZE]; Jim Ludema & Amber Johnson, The
Purpose of the Corporation? Business Roundtable Advances the Conversation, Now We All Need
to Contribute, FORBES, (Aug. 20, 2019, 4:42 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/amberjohnsonjimludema/2019/08/20/the-purpose-of-the-corporation/#25c6fd5b3846
[https://perma.cc/7F4HSJSC].
3. Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That
Serves All Americans’, BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.businessroundtable.org/
business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-servesall-americans [https://perma.cc/RJW6-ZBHW].
4. Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2018 Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose, BLACKROCK
(2018), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://
perma.cc/E5UX-JLB2].
5. Cf. David Kershaw & Edmund-Philip Schuster, The Purposive Transformation of Company
Law, 68 AM. J. COMP. L. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 5–11), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3363267
[https://perma.cc/V6LX-ASFF] (discussing various meanings of “purpose” possible under UK
corporate law).
6. Not all commentators support this shift. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Glenn
Hubbard, Should the Modern Corporation Maximize Shareholder Value?, 2020 AEI
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 1, https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Should-the-ModernCorporation-Maximize-Shareholder-Value.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2DU-QXHA] (arguing that the
modern corporation should maximize shareholder value).
7. Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 6 (2018). See also Elizabeth
Warren, Companies Shouldn’t Be Accountable Only to Shareholders, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-shouldnt-be-accountable-only-toshareholders-1534287687 [https://perma.cc/2BKW-PDJM] (outlining the parameters of her
legislative proposal and stating it would “require[] corporate directors to consider the interests of
all major corporate stakeholders—not only shareholders—in company decisions”). Other countries
including the UK and those within the European Union are moving to stewardship models that
explicitly specify social as well as economic objectives. See Consults on UK Stewardship Code
Updates, FCLTGLOBAL (Apr. 3, 2019), https://fcltglobal.org/resource/fcltglobal-consults-on-ukstewardship-code-updates/ [https://perma.cc/V5E5-QMNY] (“[S]tewardship codes now exist in
over 20 countries worldwide . . . .”).
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constituency-minded or social purposes.8 At the extreme, some
commentators suggest that corporations should be encouraged to make
decisions that deliberately sacrifice economic value in favor of the public
interest.9
These arguments run counter to the traditional view that corporations
should be managed with the primary goal of pursuing economic value for
shareholders, often referred to as “shareholder primacy.” Although
commentators widely agree that shareholder primacy affords managers
substantial latitude to consider the interests of nonshareholder
constituencies—a principle formalized in many areas of corporate law such
as the business judgment rule, statutes authorizing corporations to donate
money to charity, and, in many states, constituency statutes—the new
discussion calls for corporations to shift their primary objective to
incorporate a public purpose. Critics justify this shift by citing corporations’
excessive focus on short-term profits, the negative externalities imposed by
corporations on nonshareholder groups, and the need to address societal
problems such as wealth inequality and climate change.
In this Article, we address the fundamental issue of corporate purpose.
We do so by reframing the argument. The current debate does not address
key predicate questions: what it means for a corporation to have a purpose,
whether corporations should have a purpose at all and, if so, what role
corporate purpose can serve? We note that these questions are, to a degree,
independent of the normative question about what a corporation’s purpose
should be.10

8. See, e.g., David Gelles, Marc Benioff of Salesforce: ‘Are We Not All Connected?’, N.Y.
TIMES (June 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/15/business/marc-benioff-salesforcecorner-office.html [https://perma.cc/38AH-7C8H] (“When I went to U.S.C., it was all about
maximizing value for shareholders. But we’re moving into a world of stakeholders.”); About Us,
NESTLÉ, https://www.nestle.com/aboutus [https://perma.cc/MRH5-ED49] (“Unlocking the power
of food to enhance quality of life for everyone, today and for generations to come. That is our
purpose.”). See generally Omar Rodríguez-Vilá & Sundar Bharadwaj, Competing on Social
Purpose, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 2017, at 94, https://hbr.org/2017/09/competing-on-socialpurpose [https://perma.cc/SE7A-B7MW] (“Consumers increasingly expect brands to have not just
functional benefits but a social purpose. As a result, companies are taking social stands in very
visible ways.”).
9. See, e.g., Dorothy S. Lund, Corporate Finance for Social Good, 121 COLUM. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 11), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=3511631 [https://perma.cc/7HSA-4DHR] (introducing proposal designed to induce
corporations to “sacrifice profits in pursuit of social goals”). See also Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing
Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 738 (2005) (“Corporate managers
have never had an enforceable legal duty to maximize corporate profits. Rather, they have always
had some legal discretion (implicit or explicit) to sacrifice corporate profits in the public interest.”).
10. See David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 181, 183
(2013) (highlighting that corporate law scholars differ both on the positive question and the
normative dimensions of corporate purpose).
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We believe that careful attention to these questions and the issues that
they raise about the structure and use of the corporate form are critical. We
start in Part I by considering and rejecting traditional sources of corporate
purpose—including the historical requirement that corporations formally
articulate a purpose in their charters, efficiency arguments from law and
economics, and claims that purpose is necessary to overcome doctrinally
mandated profit maximization. We argue that, under existing law, both the
mutability of the corporate charter and the flexibility of the business
judgment rule give corporate managers ample discretion to consider
stakeholder and societal interests irrespective of a broad reformulation of
corporate purpose.
Next in Part II we interrogate the effect of repurposing the corporation.
We observe that few corporations have sought to implement legally binding
constraints through charter provisions. The alternative—non-charter
statements of corporate purpose and mission—are largely vague and
aspirational. We argue that these statements provide neither direction nor
legal cover to corporate decision makers, particularly if purpose is
understood as constraining the pursuit of shareholder value. Similarly, the
structural framework of the corporation renders purpose statements, standing
alone, impotent as a tool for enlisting corporations in broad-based social
change—no purpose statement can eliminate Chevron’s carbon footprint or
make Philip Morris’s cigarettes healthy.
We then seek in Part III to salvage the role of corporate purpose. We
articulate an instrumental role for purpose derived from the foundational
justification for the corporate form—a tool that facilitates the pursuit of an
agreed-upon set of business objectives. Purpose enables corporate
participants to formalize their goals and priorities, which can include not just
the pursuit of profits, but the incorporation of operational constraints,
stakeholder values, and social impact. As with purely economic goals, the
extent to which a particular corporate purpose is desirable or effective
depends on the comparative advantage of the corporate form in pursuing
those goals. Critically and distinctively, under our framing, purpose is a
means not an end; a means that allows corporate participants to signal,
monitor, and manage their expectancy interests. Purpose identifies the
metrics by which managers are to be held accountable. Purpose also informs
stakeholders as to the degree to which they must seek alternative mechanisms
to protect their claims through contract or regulation. Notably, in our
instrumental account, corporate purpose need not operate as a formal legal
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constraint,11 but it provides coherence, transparency, and coordination to
corporate decisions.12
We conclude in Part IV by considering the necessary conditions for
corporate purpose to serve this instrumental function. We argue that although
existing statements of purpose indicate a market-based need, they are largely
ineffective. To be functional, a corporate purpose must both provide concrete
guidance for the corporation’s operations, priorities, or goals and
meaningfully constrain corporate action. Many, if not most, of the statements
of corporate purpose today lack such content. Instead, we view these
statements more as mission statements rather than binding statements of
corporate purpose.13
Ultimately, our analysis adds rigor to the current debate about corporate
purpose. The world is in flux, but a sustainable and workable vision of the
corporation requires a theoretical foundation, which we provide.
I.

The Origins of Corporate Purpose
In this Part, we begin by examining the origins of corporate purpose.
We outline the history of corporate purpose. We then turn to examine the
meaning and usage of corporate purpose in the modern charter. We conclude
the section by outlining various, prior theoretical bases for corporate purpose
and its role in light of the expansive corporate purpose of today’s modern
corporation.
A.

The History of Purpose
Corporate purpose has its origins in 16th and 17th century England, in
which corporations were required to obtain Royal or Parliamentary sanction
to operate in the corporate form.14 Although the scope of powers such

11. A corporation may commit to prioritize stakeholder or societal values in its charter
in the same manner as a public benefit corporation. We posit that such a commitment would
be legally enforceable in the same manner as any other charter provision. See RICHARDS, LAYTON
& FINGER, PA, REPORT TO THE GOVERNANCE AND NOMINATING COMMITTEE OF THE
BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF WELLS FARGO & COMPANY REGARDING PUBLIC BENEFIT
CORPORATIONS 4 (2020), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2020/
harringtonwellsfargo021220-14a8.pdf [https://perma.cc/JD92-DHH5] (observing that “a
corporation may amend the purpose clause of its certificate of incorporation to add a public benefit
purpose”).
12. See generally Ofer Eldar, Designing Business Forms to Pursue Social Goals, 106 VA. L.
REV. 937, 941 (2020) (discussing the use of incentives and organization structure for corporations
to pursue social mission).
13. There is a vast literature in organizational behavior about corporate purpose and the role of
mission. We view this literature as distinct from the issue of a corporation’s legal purpose, the topic
of this article.
14. See David B. Guenther, Of Bodies Politic and Pecuniary: A Brief History of Corporate
Purpose, 9 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 1, 10 (2019) (“In the early 1600s, the English
Crown and Parliament began granting corporate charters to joint-stock companies.”).
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corporations could exercise was unclear, the idea that “the powers of the
corporation were limited by the purposes for which the corporation was
created” was recognized as a limiting principle.15 Notably, the earliest
corporate charters were not utilized by for-profit businesses but by churches,
municipalities, and universities.16 By the 18th century, Parliament extended
the use of corporate charters to trading companies such as the infamous South
Sea Company.17 Also in the 18th century, legal scholars began distinguishing
between types of corporations and looked to purpose as an element.18
The practice of corporate chartering was transferred to America. Until
the late 1800s, chartering was subject to state legislative approval.19
Legislative mistrust of corporate entities—a legacy of Jeffersonian ideals—
often led to limited grants of authority and purpose for commercial
corporations.20 In addition, “[t]he size and level of business activity had not
yet evolved to a point of needing the legal benefits provided by the corporate
form.”21 As a result, most early U.S. corporate charters were issued for public
purposes—religious organizations, cemeteries, and charities.22
The specification of corporate purpose had legal ramifications. State law
required corporations to confine their operations to the purpose identified in
their charters, and activities outside the scope of that specification were ultra
vires or beyond the corporation’s legal power.23 The ultra vires doctrine
15. W.S. Holdsworth, English Corporation Law in the 16th and 17th Centuries, 31 YALE L.J.
382, 396 (1922) (acknowledging that “though the law was accepted in this sense in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, it rested on somewhat slender authority”).
16. Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Personhood and the Corporate Persona, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV.
785, 789 (2013).
17. L.W. HANSON, CONTEMPORARY PRINTED SOURCES FOR BRITISH AND IRISH ECONOMIC
HISTORY 1701–1750, at 145 (1963).
18. Guenther, supra note 14 at 13–14.
19. Blair, supra note 16 at 793. Early use of the corporate form in the United States was also
limited to entities organized for a public purpose. See id. at 793 n.47 (citing Andrew Lamont
Creighton, The Emergence of Incorporation as a Legal Form for Organizations (July 1990)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University) (on file with author)) (reporting that prior to
the American Revolution, only seven corporations in the U.S. colonies were chartered for businesses
other than public works, banking, or insurance).
20. See CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 8 (Naomi R. Lamoreaux & William J.
Novak eds., 2017) (describing how states in the late eighteenth century awarded corporate charters
with certain privileges to commercial businesses and also limited the privileges due to “fears of
inequality, monopoly, and corruption”).
21. Susan Pace Hamill, From Special Privilege to General Utility: A Continuation of Willard
Hurst’s Study of Corporations, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 81, 92 (1999).
22. Id.
23. The ultra vires doctrine came from England. A classic example is the English case of
Introductions Ltd. v. National Provincial Bank, Ltd., [1969] 1 All ER 887, in which the court held
that it was ultra vires for a company with a purpose of organizing the Festival of Britain to breed
pigs. In the U.S., the doctrine is illustrated by Thomas v. R.R. Co., 101 U.S. 71 (1879), in which the
Supreme Court held that a railroad company lacked the power to lease its property to the plaintiffs
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protected the expectancy interests of the corporation’s investors, who
understood the enterprise into which their money was being placed and the
potential risks and rewards associated with that enterprise. The doctrine
limited the scope of business discretion afforded to corporate management.
Finally, the doctrine protected the public by placing limits on the scale and
range of corporate operations. As the Supreme Court explained, corporate
actions beyond its articulated purpose were contrary to “the relations which
the charter has arranged between the corporation and the community.”24
The industrial revolution eroded the operation of charter purpose
provisions as legal constraints on corporate behavior. 25 Increased demand for
the corporate form to facilitate the aggregation of the substantial amounts of
capital necessary for the growing scale of business activity led to growing
acceptance of the corporate form for general commercial operations. This led
states to shift from special charters to general charters that allowed
corporations to define their purpose as engaging in any lawful purpose or
business activity.26 This legislative transition enabled corporations to define
their purpose as engaging in any action permitted by law.27 As a result, the
ultra vires doctrine fell into disrepair.28 The consequence was that corporate
purpose became undefined and effectively meaningless, a matter we take up
in the next subsection.

in exchange for a receipt of half the plaintiffs’ profits. See generally Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara
Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 186 (1985) (“Before the
Civil War . . . the ultra vires doctrine was strictly applied by American courts . . . .”).
24. Thomas, 101 U.S. at 84.
25. See JOHN STEELE GORDON, THE GREAT GAME: THE EMERGENCE OF WALL STREET AS A
WORLD POWER 1653–2000, at 49 (1999) (describing how the accelerating industrial revolution
pressured states to pass general incorporation laws).
26. See Hamill, supra note 21, at 101 (chronicling the nationwide trend in enacting general
incorporation statutes in the mid-eighteenth century). A similar development occurred in England,
although it was not formalized until the adoption of the Companies Act of 1948. Stephen J. Leacock,
The Rise and Fall of the Ultra Vires Doctrine in United States, United Kingdom, and
Commonwealth Caribbean Corporate Common Law: A Triumph of Experience over Logic, 5
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 67, 81 (2006).
27. See Andrew G. T. Moore II, A Brief History of the General Corporation Law of the State of
Delaware and the Amendatory Process, in 1 DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS H-1, H-3 (3rd ed., 2020–1 supplement) (noting the change to general incorporation
law and stating that a corporation’s charter should be approved if the judge “found [the purpose] to
be lawful and not injurious to the community”).
28. But see Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality
(with Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV.
1279, 1282 (2001) (arguing that ultra vires doctrine can be used to make “compliance with the law
an enforceable obligation within corporate law”).
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The Purpose Requirement in the Modern Charter

Today, most corporate charters contain a generic statement that the
purpose of the corporation is to engage in any lawful activity.29 The
DowDuPont charter illustrates the typical formulation:
The purpose of the Company is to engage in any lawful act or activity
for which a corporation may now or hereafter be organized under the
General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware.30
Some purpose provisions are more expansive. The purpose provision in
PepsiCo’s corporate charter spans two pages and explains that the
corporation’s purposes include, inter alia, manufacturing and distributing
beverages; acquiring factories, warehouses, and stores; acquiring property;
and applying for patents and trademarks.31 Similarly, Ford Motor Company,
which incorporated under the name Eastern Holding Company in 1919, has
a detailed corporate purpose that includes the manufacture of airplanes as
well as automobiles.32 Even these more specific charters avoid specifying a
corporate purpose akin to that which existed in the early 1800s.
Notably, the typical charter provision neither identifies a purpose of
maximizing profit nor articulates a broader societal mission. Even the charter
of Salesforce, which promotes a commitment to pursue broad societal value,
provides that “[t]he purpose of the Corporation is to engage in any lawful act
or activity for which a corporation may be organized under the General

29. See, e.g., Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation, PHILIP MORRIS INT’L INC. 1
(Jan. 29, 2008), https://www.pmi.com/resources/docs/default-source/our_company/articles-ofincorporation.pdf?sfvrsn=dfe2b0b5_0 [https://perma.cc/648U-4R8F] (“The purpose for which the
Corporation is organized is the transaction of any or all lawful business not required to be
specifically stated in these Articles of Incorporation.”); Amended and Restated Certificate of
Incorporation of Tesla Motors, Inc., SEC 1, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
1318605/000119312510017054/dex31.htm [https://perma.cc/9UFF-LVT6] (“The nature of the
business or purposes to be conducted or promoted by the Corporation is to engage in any lawful act
or activity for which corporations may be organized under the DGCL.”).
30. Second Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation, DOWDUPONT INC. 1
(June 1, 2019), https://s23.q4cdn.com/116192123/files/doc_governance/2019/05/DD_-_Certificate
_of_Incorporation-(003).pdf [https://perma.cc/X997-25PY].
31. Amended
and
Restated
Articles
of
Incorporation
of
Pepsico,
Inc.,
PEPSICO 1–2 (May 1, 2019), https://www.pepsico.com/docs/album/corporate-governance/
amendedandrestatedarticlesofincorporation.pdf?sfvrsn=e84ce4e_12
[https://perma.cc/NV4NQDEG].
32. Ford Motor Company Restated Certificate of Incorporation, SEC 5 (Aug. 2, 2000),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/37996/000003799601000014/0000037996-01-0000140002.txt [https://perma.cc/JS9A-GY9C].
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Corporation Law of Delaware.”33 A few corporations go further.34 Nestlé, a
Swiss corporation, articulates its purpose in its Articles of Association as:
Article 2 Purpose
1. The purpose of Nestlé is to participate in industrial, service,
commercial and financial enterprises in Switzerland and abroad, in
particular in the food, nutrition, health, wellness and related industries.
2. Nestlé may itself establish such undertakings or participate in,
finance and promote the development of undertakings already in
existence.
3. Nestlé may enter into any transaction which the business purpose
may entail. Nestlé shall, in pursuing its business purpose, aim for
long-term, sustainable value creation.35
The language about long-term sustainable value creation was added through
amendments adopted in 2008 and supported by 99% of shareholders.36
Novo Nordisk, a Danish company, describes itself as “one of only four
companies in the world who have incorporated our philosophy into our
company bylaws.37 As a result, the three pillars of TBL[—]Social Impact,
Environmental Responsibility, and Financial Performance inform everything
we do and guide every decision we make.”38 Novo Nordisk’s Articles of
Association are more modest, stating:
33. Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation of Salesforce.com, SEC 1 (Apr. 20,
2004), https://sec.report/Document/0001193125-04-065496/dex32.htm [https://perma.cc/Y5D3NKTN].
34. The Supreme Court quoted Hobby Lobby’s statement of purpose as “[h]onoring the Lord in
all [they] do by operating the company in a manner consistent with Biblical principles.” Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 703 (2014). The Court did not specify how this statement
was incorporated into the company’s governing documents or address whether it was legally
binding.
35. Articles of Association of Nestlé S.A., NESTLÉ 1 (June 2020), https://www
.nestle.com/sites/default/files/asset-library/documents/library/documents/corporate_governance/
articles-of-association-of-nestle-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8MK-UBDU].
36. See Nestlé: Articles of Association to Be Thoroughly Amended, ETHOS (June 4, 2006),
https://ethosfund.ch/en/news/nestle-articles-of-association-to-be-thoroughly-amended
[https://
perma.cc/3TFW-RBMK] (announcing that 98.12% of Nestlé shareholders approved a global
revision of the company’s Articles of Association); see also David Frick, Refocusing Governance
on Value Creation, in ICGN YEARBOOK 36, 37 (2018), http://icgn.flpbks.com/icgn-yearbook-2018/
[https://perma.cc/6BE2-DEGG] (describing how in 2008, 99% of Nestlé shareholders supported
revising the Articles of Incorporation to include a new “purpose clause” that would prioritize longterm, sustainable value creation).
37. We note that Novo Nordisk, a company that has been cited for its commitment to social
value, is somewhat distinctive in that its controlling stockholder is the Novo Nordisk Foundation, a
nonprofit. See Holdings, NOVO HOLDINGS, https://www.novoholdings.dk/about/holdings/#:~:
text=The%20Novo%20Group%20is%20a%20group%20of%20independent,Novozymes%20A%2
FS%2C%20both%20of%20which%20are%20publicly%20listed [https://perma.cc/WD9K-4YH2]
(explaining that the Novo Foundation owns 25% of the shares and controls 70% of the vote at Novo
Nordisk).
38. Triple Bottom Line, NOVO NORDISK, https://www.novonordisk-us.com/whoweare/aboutnovo-nordisk/triple-bottom-line.html [https://perma.cc/VMU2-CPRR].
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The Company’s objects are to carry out research and development and
to manufacture and commercialize pharmaceutical, medical and
technical products and services as well as any other activity related
thereto as determined by the Board of Directors. The Company strives
to conduct its activities in a financially, environmentally, and socially
responsible way.39
Even these articulations of broader social purpose are vague and do not
reflect actual commitments. Significantly, Philip Morris, which
manufactures cigarettes, articulates a similar commitment to societal value
on its website,40 explaining “[w]e strive to continuously improve the
sustainability of our business and to contribute to the global sustainability
agenda.”41 The impact of these purpose statements on corporate operations
and the extent to which they are subject to meaningful enforcement are
unclear.
We see little evidence that the contemporary effort to repurpose the
corporation contemplates amending corporate charters along the lines of
Nestlé or Novo Nordisk, either to incorporate aspirational sustainability
language or more concrete objectives such as gender equality, environmental
responsibility, or restraint in the production of hazardous products. Although
we believe that charter provisions would be a legally effective method of
constraining corporate operations, embedding stakeholder or societal values
in a corporation’s governing documents requires consideration by the board
(which must propose such a charter provision) of the precise role that those
constraints should play, as well as communicating accurately to shareholders
(who must approve such an amendment) the impact of the changes on the
corporate actions. It is therefore productive to consider more carefully the
potential value of articulating a corporate purpose. We turn to that question
in the next Part. First, however, we consider the two major theoretical
arguments about corporate purpose.

C.

Theoretical Arguments About Corporate Purpose
Both economic theory and the personhood theory of the corporation
have been cited as sources for corporate purpose. In contrast to our historical
analysis, these theoretical accounts also support specific normative visions.
In the case of economic theory, the normative vision is one of shareholder

39. Articles of Association of Novo Nordisk A/S, NOVO NORDISK 3 (Sept. 15, 2020),
https://novonordiskfonden.dk/en/about-the-foundation/articles-of-association/ [https://perma.cc/
CM4Y-2EY3].
40. The charter provides that: “The purpose for which the Corporation is organized is the
transaction of any or all lawful business not required to be specifically stated in these Articles of
Incorporation.” PHILIP MORRIS INT’L INC., supra note 29.
41. Sustainable
Future,
PHILIP
MORRIS
INT’L,
https://web.archive.org/web/
20200227225457/https://www.pmi.com/sustainability/ [https://perma.cc/QU7P-8EEK].
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primacy. Milton Friedman’s widely-cited statement that the purpose of the
corporation is to maximize profits,42 a statement subsequently embraced by
a host of academics and business leaders,43 is based on principles of economic
efficiency.
Economic theory defends shareholder primacy as the most efficient
operating principle, reasoning that, because shareholders are the residual
claimants in a corporation,44 maximizing shareholder value has the effect of
maximizing firm value.45 This argument directly supports shareholder
primacy but as a means not an end, in that the ultimate economic objective is
maximizing the value of the firm itself. Under a utilitarian perspective and,
assuming no negative externalities, maximizing firm value is consistent with
maximizing social welfare.46 Maximizing shareholder value as an operational
principle need not dictate allocational issues. At least some of those who
advocate shareholder primacy do so not out of a normative conviction that
shareholder interests should dominate but out of the expectation that
operating a corporation to maximize profits will result in value creation for
all firm stakeholders.47 In addition, tax and transfer systems can be used to
redistribute economic value to nonshareholders.
42. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 13, 1970), https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/13/archives/a-friedman-doctrine-thesocial-responsibility-of-business-is-to.html [https://perma.cc/5GYL-XA8L] (theorizing that the
only social responsibility of business is to increase its profits).
43. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 15 (1991) (rejecting the concept of “social contracts” in the context of corporate
law); Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 1911, 1921 (1996) (“The efficiency goal of maximizing the company’s value to investors
remains, in our view, the principal function of corporate law.”); Michael Bradley, Cindy A.
Schipani, Anant K. Sundaram & James P. Walsh, The Purposes and Accountability of the
Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a Crossroads, L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1999, at 9, 11 (describing how the dominant view is that corporate governance
should be focused solely on the relationship between a corporation and its shareholders); Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 441
(2001) (contending that corporate managers should be held accountable only to shareholders).
44. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 281 (West) (providing for distribution of all remaining assets
of a dissolved corporation to its shareholders).
45. See, e.g., Michael Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate
Objective Function 11 (Amos Tuck Sch. of Bus. at Dartmouth Coll., Working Paper No. 01-09;
Negotiation, Org. and Mkts. Unit, Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 01-01, 2001),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=220671
[https://perma.cc/G6XF-HW5W]
(“[Two hundred] years’ worth of work in economics and finance indicate that social welfare is
maximized when all firms in an economy attempt to maximize their own total firm value.”).
46. See Mark E. Van Der Weide, Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Stakeholders, 21 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 27, 62 (1996) (“Therefore, maximizing the present value of the corporation’s earnings
stream maximizes the total value of the corporation and, thus, maximizes the corporation’s
contribution to social wealth.”).
47. See Ian B. Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate About Shareholder Primacy, 31 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 533, 537–38 (2006) (noting some proponents argue that “whatever non-shareholders
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Three subsidiary efficiency considerations support shareholder primacy.
First, shareholder economic value is a particularly transparent metric,
especially in the context of public corporations where it can be measured,
albeit imperfectly and noisily, by observing stock prices. Second, there are
reasons to think that shareholder interests are “largely unitary” in the sense
that “[m]anagers maximizing the wealth of shareholders as a group generally
help all shareholders pro rata.”48 Third, because corporate law vests
shareholders with some decision-making authority, through their power to
elect directors and vote on certain structural issues such as mergers and bylaw
and charter amendments, shareholders have the legal power to hold officers
and directors accountable.49
Scholars have challenged the economic rationale for shareholder
primacy. Modern commentators typically reject the view that shareholders
are the sole residual claimants in the firm.50 Importantly, to the extent that
other stakeholders are not fully protected by contract, regulation, or
otherwise, maximizing shareholder value may result in transfers to
shareholders from those other claimants rather than increasing overall firm
value.51 Summer Kim has also uncovered evidence that, as historical matter,
a variety of stakeholders have been treated as the residual claimants of the
corporation.52 Other commentators have attacked the norm as creating
wealth-destroying externalities.53 Moreover, the principle itself has been

forego in accepting shareholder primacy is more than compensable out of the enhanced value of the
arrangement for the shareholders”).
48. Henry T.C. Hu & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Abolition of the Corporate Duty to Creditors,
107 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1352 (2007).
49. See Memorandum from Edward B. Rock to the Advisers and Members of Consultative
Group 8 (Jan. 13, 2020) (on file with author) (arguing that corporations have a purpose to maximize
shareholder profits in part due to the structure of Delaware law which provides shareholders control
over the corporation). These attributes are likely overstated. For example, nonshareholder
stakeholders can obtain control and accountability through contractual mechanisms. See, e.g.,
Michael Ohlrogge, Bankruptcy Claim Dischargeability and Public Externalities: Evidence from a
Natural Experiment (Feb. 14, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3273486
[https://perma.cc/SMC5-4L9M] (describing environmental covenants in lending agreements).
50. See Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values and
Cognitive Style, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 652 (2004) (“The traditional law and economics
perspective holds that in determining the maximands of the corporation, exclusive priority should
be given to its residual claimants. . . . This position, however, does not, in reality, hold true.”).
51. See, e.g., Van Der Weide, supra note 46, at 62 (noting the tensions between relatively shortterm interests of employees and creditors and the long-term, value-maximizing interests of
shareholders).
52. See Summer Kim, A Multi-Criteria Assessment of Corporate Residual Claimants 6
(Mar. 30, 2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=3816061 [https://perma.cc/N7F2-G354] (“Depending on which of the theories of rent, interest,
wages, or profit was adopted, each of landlord, capitalist, laborer, and entrepreneur have been the
residual claimants of the corporation over time.”).
53. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 47, at 539–62 (discussing academic arguments that shareholder
primacy creates wealth-destroying externalities).
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attacked head-on for creating short-termism in corporations.54 In this regard,
scholars have noted that shareholders themselves have heterogeneous
interests, making it difficult to decide exactly to whom, among a group of
shareholders, directors and the firm should cater.55
More problematically, even if shareholder value is correlated with firm
value, some societal interests do not fall within the contours of the firm. To
the extent that maximizing shareholder (or firm) value sacrifices these
interests, that operating policy creates negative externalities. Economic
theory does not supply an answer to the normative question of how corporate
law or individual operational decisions should weigh these costs, but any
broad-based efficiency theory must grapple with them.
Corporate personhood theory takes the opposite approach; it is generally
used to justify a corporate purpose that is altruistic or concerned with
increasing societal welfare. Personhood theory treats the corporation as a
person and argues that, as a result, corporations should have the legal, moral,
and ethical obligations of people.56 The corporate social responsibility
movement57 was premised on the position that economic entities have moral
obligations and offered various rationales for these obligations.58
The personhood theory of the corporation is articulated most frequently
in connection with cases concerning the legal rights of the corporation.59
Although some scholars draw upon these cases for the principle that a
corporation should be recognized as a legal person to attribute to the
corporation moral or ethical obligations of personhood, such a reading

54. See William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV.
1275, 1284 (2002) (arguing that shareholder value maximization has in part meant “obsession with
short-term performance numbers”).
55. See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60
STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1283 (2008) (noting that investors may not share “a common economic goal”).
56. See, e.g., Susanna K. Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional
Approach to the Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 117 (2009)
(“If the corporation is a real person in society, it should have the same sorts of moral and social
responsibilities that individuals have.”).
57. See, e.g., John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish: Theory
Versus Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31 J. CORP. L. 1, 1–5 (2005)
(chronicling the development of the CSR movement).
58. See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, From Moral Obligation to International Law: Disclosure
Systems, Markets and the Regulation of Multinational Corporations, 39 GEO. J. INT’L L. 591, 606
(2008) (describing alternative justifications for the moral obligations of corporate entities,
including, for example, a Catholic social thought and contemporary socio-economic theory).
59. See STEPHEN WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON
THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS 400–401 (2018) (describing cases granting corporations the right to sue, due
process rights, and contract rights). More recently, the Court has granted corporations the right to
engage in political speech and religious rights. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S.
682, 707-08 (2014) (holding that corporations have the right to free exercise of religion); Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310, 343, 365 (2010) (holding that corporations
have the right to make political donations).
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misconstrues the rationale behind the decisions.60 The Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence in these cases does not extend constitutional rights on the basis
that corporations are like natural persons but instead provides rights to
corporations to protect shareholder individuals.61 As Professor Elizabeth
Pollman has argued, “the so-called doctrine of corporate personhood does not
provide guidance for determining the scope of corporate rights.”62 It instead
is a theory of the expression of these rights, based on an associational view
of the corporation.
The personhood theory could generate a corporate purpose grounded in
the purpose of individual corporate participants. The challenge with this is
that corporations are comprised of a variety of stakeholders with widely
varying objectives. Even if the inquiry is limited to shareholders, a
corporation’s shareholders vary as to their timeframe, their liquidity needs,
their tax situation, the ESG issues that they consider important, and their
willingness to prioritize those interests over economic value.63 Personhood
theory can serve as a basis for imputing a corporate purpose only under the
misguided assumption that shareholders either have homogenous interests or
that the tools of corporate decision-making—such as majority shareholder
voting or delegation to corporate directors—are a basis for resolving intrashareholder differences, an issue that we consider in further detail below.
More broadly, even if a corporation had the legal or ethical obligations
of a natural person, imputing such obligations provides little guidance in
identifying a particular corporate purpose. Natural persons have varying
purposes, objectives, and self-imposed constraints on their pursuit of those
objectives. These constraints may be social, moral, ethical, political,
religious, or philosophical in origin. Even among individuals, there is
widespread disagreement on what constitutes ethical behavior, limiting the
potential for personhood theory to answer that question for the corporation.
Thus, we find no rationale for corporate purpose in economic theory or the
corporate personhood literature. In the next section we examine legal
justifications for corporate purpose based on shareholder primacy.
II.

Purpose and Legal Arguments about Shareholder Primacy

Repurposing the corporation is most frequently an attempt to address
the argument that corporations are legally required to focus exclusively or
primarily on maximizing shareholder economic value. The extent to which
existing law mandates shareholder primacy is hotly contested, and we
60. See Blair, supra note 16, at 797 (“[L]egal decisions that make reference to the idea [of
corporate personhood] have often been sources of confusion.”).
61. Elizabeth Pollman, A Corporate Right to Privacy, 99 MINN. L. REV. 27, 51 (2014).
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 55 (“[T]he belief that minority shareholders share
a common economic goal has also become inaccurate.”).
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therefore explore that claim in some detail. Ultimately, we reject the
proposition that existing law prohibits corporate decision makers from
considering and incorporating the interests of stakeholders and society; we
conclude that corporations currently have the power—and indeed the
obligation—to consider those interests irrespective of their articulated
purpose.
Purpose advocates send mixed messages about the relationship of
corporate purpose to shareholder value.64 On the one hand, they justify
repurposing by claiming that shareholder primacy has enabled corporations
to ignore or affirmatively harm the interests of other stakeholders and society
at large. They further describe the existing legal doctrine as essentially
requiring corporations to do so. On the other, they claim that considering
stakeholder interests in fact promotes greater long-term economic value for
investors, suggesting that stakeholder value is entirely consistent with
shareholder primacy.65
As early as 1901, one court observed that “[t]he real object and purpose
of a corporation for profit is to make a profit and to make dividends for the
stockholders, and a person who holds the stock of a company has a right to
have the business of the company conducted, as far as practicable at least, so
that it will make profits and pay dividends.”66 The view that corporations
should be managed with the objective of maximizing shareholder economic
value found perhaps its most explicit articulation in the 1919 case of Dodge
v. Ford.67 In Dodge v. Ford, the Michigan Supreme Court stated “[a] business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end.”68

64. See, e.g., Adam B. Badawi & Frank Partnoy, Measuring How Corporations Impact Society:
The Relationship Between ESD Metrics and Securities Litigation 11 (unpublished manuscript),
https://insights.truvaluelabs.com/hubfs/Academic%20Research%20Network/ARN_Partnoy_ESGa
ndLitigation.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2XP-KFNX] (explaining that ESG metrics can be understood
as “capturing ways in which a focus on ESG is consistent with maximizing shareholder returns”
or alternatively “measur[ing] deviations from shareholder returns that inure to the benefit of
stakeholders”).
65. For example, in describing its decision to convert to a PBC and formally adopt a public
benefit in its charter, Veeva explained, “We believe social and economic benefits go hand in hand
and have always operated with the long-term view that doing the right thing for our customers,
employees, and communities ultimately allows us to deliver the best results for investors.” Peter
Gassner, Veeva: A Public Benefit Corporation, VEEVA, https://www.veeva.com/pbc/
[https://perma.cc/8637-6XTF]. See also ALEX EDMANS, GROW THE PIE: HOW GREAT COMPANIES
DELIVER BOTH PURPOSE AND PROFIT 3–4 (2020) (claiming that the pie-growing mentality
advocated by the book, in which a company’s purpose is based on increasing social value, “typically
ends up more profitable than if profits were the end goal”).
66. Arbuckle v. Woolson Spice Co., 1901 WL 708, at *2 (Ohio Cir. Dec. Jan. 12, 1901).
67. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
68. Id. at 684.

FISCH.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

1324

7/18/2021 6:00 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 99:1309

The case forms the central foundation of the argument that the purpose of the
for-profit corporation is to maximize value for shareholders.69
The strongest legal authority that corporate managers are legally
obligated to focus exclusively on maximizing shareholder profits comes from
Delaware. In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,70 the
court held that a board facing a change of control was required to obtain the
“highest price for the benefit of the stockholders.”71 Revlon explicitly rejected
the argument that, at least in the context of a case sale, a corporate board
could prioritize the interests of a nonshareholder constituency (noteholders)
over the interests of the shareholders.72 Revlon is widely cited for the
principle that a board’s sole duty is to maximize economic value for
shareholders regardless of the impact of its decision on nonshareholder
constituencies.
More recently, the Delaware Chancery Court sent a similar message in
its rejection of craigslist’s adoption of a poison pill against its own
shareholder, eBay. In eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark,73 the court
criticized the board’s justification for adopting the pill, namely that eBay was
attempting to force the company to earn more profit.74 The court explained
that “[t]he corporate form in which craigslist operates, however, is not an
appropriate vehicle for purely philanthropic ends, at least not when there are
other stockholders interested in realizing a return on their investment.”75
We believe that reading these cases to incorporate a broad requirement
of shareholder primacy in corporate law goes too far. First, other Delaware
takeover cases expressly recognize the potential power of corporate decision
makers to consider stakeholder interests. In Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,76
the Delaware Supreme Court held that when a board took defensive action in
response to a takeover threat, it must have “reasonable grounds for believing
that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed.”77 Notably,
however, Unocal did not identify shareholders as the only constituency
69. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 141 (2d ed. 2009) (“It is well-settled
that directors have a duty to maximize shareholder wealth.”) (citing Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170
N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919)); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed
Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General
Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 776–77 (2015) (“Dodge v. Ford and eBay are
hornbook law because they make clear that if a fiduciary admits that he is treating an interest other
than stockholder wealth as an end in itself, rather than an instrument to stockholder wealth, he is
committing a breach of fiduciary duty.”).
70. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985).
71. Id. at 182.
72. Id.
73. 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).
74. Id. at 34.
75. Id. at 34.
76. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
77. Id. at 955.
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relevant to the board’s assessment. Instead, the court described the board’s
obligation as evaluating the effect of the takeover bid “on the corporate
enterprise.”78 Indeed, the board’s analysis could include, inter alia, “the
impact on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers,
employees, and perhaps even the community generally).”79 Similarly, in
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,80 the Delaware Supreme
Court noted that the board is “not under any per se duty to maximize
shareholder value in the short term, even in the context of a takeover.”81 The
court noted, without criticism, that the primary objective of Time’s outside
directors—in pursuing a transaction with Warner rather than Paramount—
was to preserve Time’s culture, more specifically “the editorial integrity and
journalistic focus of Time.”82
Second, Revlon and eBay involve the takeover context. Takeovers differ
from traditional operational decisions for a number of reasons, including lastperiod problems and questions about the scope of authority delegated to the
board. As such, takeover law provides a variety of distinctive legal rules—
including heightened fiduciary duties, greater disclosure obligations, and
enhanced shareholder decision-making and exit rights—that are not present
in day-to-day corporate decisions.
Even if the Delaware case law is properly understood as conveying a
strong commitment to shareholder primacy in the takeover context, we
question its relevance to the day-to-day operational decisions that are the
focus of the current purpose debate. The eBay decision itself provides support
for this distinction; the court’s holding was limited to prohibiting craigslist
from implementing a poison pill.83 The decision expressly observed that the
craigslist board provided “a website for online classifieds that is largely
devoid of monetized elements,” and it observed that the craigslist founders
and controlling shareholders are “perfectly able to ensure the continuation of
craigslist’s ‘culture’ so long as they remain majority stockholders.”84
Nowhere did it suggest that the decision to do so was inconsistent with their
fiduciary obligations.

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
81. Id. at 1150.
82. Id. at 1143, 1152.
83. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“I cannot accept
as valid for the purposes of implementing the Rights Plan a corporate policy that specifically,
clearly, and admittedly seeks not to maximize the economic value of a for-profit Delaware
corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.” (emphasis added)).
84. Id. at 34–35. We view the eBay case as consistent with the Delaware courts’ holdings that
fiduciaries cannot take inequitable conduct. The court in eBay cited Schnell v. Chris–Craft Indus.,
Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) for this proposition. Id. at 38.
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Third, decisions such as Dodge and Revlon can perhaps better be
understood as implicating the duty of loyalty rather than mandating
shareholder primacy. Professor Lynn Stout observed that Dodge is consistent
with the obligation that controlling shareholders have “not to oppress
minority shareholders.”85 Similarly, eBay can be read as a limitation on the
ability of controlling shareholders to pursue their idiosyncratic objectives at
the expense of minority shareholders, a concern that fits better within the duty
of loyalty framework than within the scope of corporate purpose.86 More
broadly, the “animating principle” behind Revlon and the other Delaware
takeover cases is regulating inherent conflicts of interest, based both on the
concern that conflicts of interest are ubiquitous in takeover cases and that, in
that context, the costs of inadequately policed conflicts are particularly
high.87
The argument that these cases are about managerial loyalty rather than
shareholder primacy is reinforced by recent developments in the Delaware
courts’ Caremark88 jurisprudence. Caremark requires a board to undertake a
good faith effort to “‘to exercise oversight’ and to monitor the corporation’s
operational viability, legal compliance, and financial performance.”89
Although Caremark duties were originally articulated as a component of the
duty of care,90 the Delaware courts subsequently incorporated oversight
failures into the duty of loyalty.91
At the same time, recent Delaware Caremark decisions suggest that
insufficient attention to stakeholder interests may itself be legally actionable.
In Marchand v. Barnhill, the Delaware Supreme Court refused to grant a
motion to dismiss a claim that Blue Bell’s board failed to implement a boardlevel food safety program despite the presence of both “red” and “yellow”
flags.92 The court specifically highlighted the importance of customer
interests to Blue Bell’s continued operational success. The court stated that
“[a]s a monoline company that makes a single product—ice cream—Blue
Bell can only thrive if its consumers enjoyed its products and were confident
85. Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163,
168 (2008).
86. See eBay, 16 A.3d at 34 (observing that the craigslist founders were acting “because of their
own personal preferences”).
87. Zachary J. Gubler, What’s the Deal with Revlon? 10, 13 (Feb. 24, 2020) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
88. 698 A.2d. 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
89. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 809 (Del. 2019) (citing Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362,
364 (Del. 2006)).
90. E.g., Peter D. Bordonaro, Comment, Good Faith: Set In Stone?, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1119, 1135
(2008) (“Caremark liability was originally based on a violation of the duty of care.”).
91. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (“It follows that because a showing of
bad faith conduct, in the sense described in Disney and Caremark, is essential to establish director
oversight liability, the fiduciary duty violated by that conduct is the duty of loyalty.”).
92. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 809.

FISCH.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

Should Corporations Have a Purpose?

7/18/2021 6:00 PM

1327

that its products were safe to eat.”93 In the wake of Marchand, Delaware
courts have seen an uptick in Caremark claims,94 and corporations have
increased their focus on risk assessment and compliance.95
Outside Delaware, legal support for shareholder primacy is even more
limited. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,96 the U.S. Supreme Court
read the statutory right of a corporation to be organized for any lawful
purpose as providing corporations with the legal authority to further
humanitarian objectives, at least in addition to furthering economic value.97
As the Court explained:
Each American jurisdiction today either expressly or by implication
authorizes corporations to be formed under its general corporation
act . . . While it is certainly true that a central objective of for-profit
corporations is to make money, modern corporate law does not require
for-profit corporations to pursue profit at the expense of everything
else, and many do not do so.98
To be sure, Hobby Lobby was based in part on the fact that the
corporation had such a small number of shareholders that its idiosyncratic
purpose was discernable and expressed. Nonetheless, Hobby Lobby appears
to stand for the proposition that a corporation can have an alternative purpose
from profit maximization.99
Moreover, many states have explicitly rejected Revlon. A majority of
U.S. states have adopted so-called constituency statutes that expressly
authorize corporate officials to consider a range of stakeholder interests in
addition to shareholder interests.100 The Wisconsin constituency statute, for
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Hughes v. Xiaoming Hu, No. 2019-0112-JTL, 2020 WL 1987029, at *12 (Del.
Ch. Apr. 27, 2020) (denying motion to dismiss where complaint “alleges facts that support an
inference that the Company’s Audit Committee met sporadically, devoted inadequate time to its
work, had clear notice of irregularities, and consciously turned a blind eye to their continuation”);
In re Clovis Oncology, No. 2017-0222-JRS, 2019 WL 4850188, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019)
(refusing to dismiss Caremark claim when complaint alleged board ignored “red flags that Clovis
was not adhering to the clinical trial protocols, thereby placing FDA approval of the drug in
jeopardy”).
95. See John Mark Zeberkiewicz & Robert B. Greco, In re Clovis: Considering Caremark
Claims after Marchand, INSIGHTS: CORP. & SEC. L. ADVISOR, Nov. 2019, at 36, 38 (“The Clovis
opinion signals that, post-Marchand, the Delaware courts, in assessing Caremark claims at the
pleading stage, may hold boards operating in highly regulated industries to a somewhat elevated
standard for monitoring and assessing compliance with mission-critical regulatory regimes.”).
96. 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
97. Id. at 712–13.
98. Id. at 711–12 (citations omitted).
99. Notably, the Court did not identify the formal manner in which Hobby Lobby articulated or
committed to its purpose.
100. See Matthew D. Cain, Stephen D. McKeon & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Do Takeover
Laws Matter? Evidence from Five Decades of Hostile Takeovers, 124 J. FIN. ECON. 464, 471 (2017)

FISCH.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

1328

7/18/2021 6:00 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 99:1309

example, provides that, in discharging their duties, corporate officers and
directors may consider the effect of their actions on “employees, suppliers
and customers of the corporation,” the “communities in which the
corporation operates,” and “[a]ny other factors that the director or officer
considers pertinent.”101 Although Delaware has not adopted such a statute, a
few Delaware corporations have adopted equivalent positions in their
charters.102 We are unaware of any Delaware case exploring the validity or
legal significance of such a charter provision. Although these statutes do not
specify how corporate decision makers should prioritize different stakeholder
interests, they clearly authorize decisions that do not focus exclusively on
maximizing economic value for shareholders.103
III. The Functional Role of Corporate Purpose
Having considered legal, historical, and theoretical justifications and
found them unsatisfying, we turn to consider the potential functional role of
corporate purpose. As we understand it, commentators advocate that
corporations articulate their purpose as a mechanism for controlling
corporate behavior and, in particular, to further a stakeholder or public
orientation for corporate decisions. Concededly, a corporation could
articulate its purpose as making cigarettes attractive to children to get them
addicted at an early age and ensure long-term demand for its product, but we
do not think that is what purpose advocates have in mind. Rather, they view
the articulation of purpose as facilitating a shift away from shareholder
primacy in favor of the stakeholder or public interests.
Although we have highlighted the limited basis for treating shareholder
primacy as a legal mandate, one response is that the decisions we discuss,
coupled with a supportive academic literature, have influenced managerial
decision-making and that corporate officials are likely to focus on

(documenting the adoption of constituency laws); Christopher Geczy, Jessica S. Jeffers, David K.
Musto & Anne M. Tucker, Institutional Investing When Shareholders Are Not Supreme, 5 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. 73, 95 (2015) (reporting that 33 states currently have constituency statutes).
101. WIS. STAT. § 180.0827 (2021).
102. See, e.g., Restated Certificate of Incorporation of the McClatchy Company,
SEC 4, https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1056087/000119312506154574/dex31.htm
[https://perma.cc/7TP8-PAZV] (“In the consideration and approval of all policies and actions of the
Corporation, the Board of Directors shall have the right to consider all relevant factors which are in
the best interests of the Corporation and its stockholders, including and in addition to the financial
interests of stockholders, community standards and values, the welfare of employees, and the quality
and independence of the Corporation and its publishing enterprise.”). See also Ofer Eldar, The Role
of Social Enterprise and Hybrid Organizations, 1 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 92, 189 (2017) (discussing
the use of charter provisions for companies to pursue social purpose).
103. See Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Shareholders, Nonshareholders, and Corporate
Law: Communitarianism and Resource Allocation, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 393, 403 (1993) (noting that
constituency statutes change the focus from the welfare of shareholders to the welfare of both
shareholder and nonshareholder constituencies).
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shareholder value and, even more problematically, on short-term stock price,
in making operational decisions.104 An explicit revision of corporate purpose
to include other stakeholders is the proposed solution, and it is a solution that
is gathering momentum. On the manager side, the Business Roundtable
revised its statement of corporate purpose and replaced shareholder primacy
with a commitment to further the interests of all stakeholders, and 181
corporate CEOs endorsed that statement.105 On the shareholder side, several
investors have introduced shareholder proposals encouraging corporations
either to modify the purpose statements in their charters or to convert to
Public Benefit Corporations (PBCs), which are required to adopt a public
purpose. Most recently, Veeva became the first publicly traded corporation
to convert to a PBC106 and, as part of that conversion, to adopt the following
public benefit purpose:
Public Benefit Purpose. The specific public benefits to be promoted
by the corporation are to provide products and services that are
intended to help make the industries we serve more productive, and to
create high-quality employment opportunities in the communities in
which we operate.107
The function of these statements of purpose is unclear and, we argue,
problematic.108 Defending corporate purpose based on its capacity to function
as an operational constraint comingles several distinct concepts as
highlighted in the table below:109

104. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder Primacy, 161 U. PA. L.
REV. 2003, 2020 (2013) (arguing that shareholder primacy can, by focusing managers on short-term
stock price, have the effect of “harm[ing] public corporations’ abilities to generate future products
and profits, to the collective detriment of creditors, employees, consumers, suppliers, and long-term
shareholders alike”).
105. BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 3.
106. Veeva Becomes First Public Company to Convert to a Public Benefit Corporation,
BUSINESSWIRE (Jan. 14, 2021, 8:03 AM), https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/veevabecomes-first-public-company-to-convert-to-a-public-benefit-corporation-1029967097
[https://perma.cc/2UXA-4VSN].
107. Veeva Systems Inc., Proxy Statement for Special Meeting, VEEVA 1 (Jan. 13, 2021),
https://s2.q4cdn.com/456805372/files/doc_financials/2021/ar/20.12.04-Proxy-Statement-forSpecial-Meeting.pdf [https://perma.cc/GS24-5TM3].
108. Some commentators have described the Business Roundtable’s statement as ineffective or
greenwashing. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of
Stakeholder Governance, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 98 (2020) (characterizing the statement as
“largely representing a rhetorical public relations move”). We take no position here on whether the
statement truly reflects the intentionality of its signatories.
109. We use the term stakeholder here as shorthand to capture nonshareholder interests
generally, including the public interest. See id. at 116–19 (exploring variation in the use of the term
stakeholder).
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Long-Term
Shareholder Value
Purpose
Q1: Legal obligation to
consider non-shareholder
interests but only to the
extent they promote longterm shareholder value

Long-Term
Stakeholder Value
Purpose
Q2: Legal obligation to
consider non-shareholder
interests irrespective of
their effect on long-term
shareholder value

Q3: Power but not
obligation to consider
non-shareholder interests
but only to the extent
they promote long-term
shareholder value

Q4: Power but not
obligation to consider
non-shareholder interests
irrespective of their
effect on long-term
shareholder value

The table demonstrates that purpose can have positive legal bite by
creating an affirmative obligation for corporate decision makers to consider
particular interests, or it can be merely aspirational. Constituency statutes are
examples of the latter in that they authorize but do not compel corporate
officials to consider nonshareholder constituencies. In addition, a theory of
corporate purpose could both identify specified objectives as normatively
desirable and authorize or compel corporate decision makers to prioritize
those interests. Shareholder primacy, as traditionally understood, prioritizes
the interests of shareholders over those of other stakeholders.
Consider the options presented by the table. We argue that if purpose is
understood to play the role described in quadrants 1 and 3, it does not depart
from traditional shareholder primacy. If corporate officials are charged with
maximizing shareholder value, and the consideration of stakeholder interests
enhances shareholder value,110 then properly informed corporate officials
will do so regardless of whether the corporate purpose statement identifies
the consideration of such interests as a distinct obligation, and their broad

110. The empirical evidence in support of this claim is mixed. See, e.g., TENSIE WHELAN,
ULRICH ATZ, TRACY VAN HOLT & CASEY CLARK, NYU STERN CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE BUS.,
ESG AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE: UNCOVERING THE RELATIONSHIP BY AGGREGATING
EVIDENCE FROM 1,000 PLUS STUDIES PUBLISHED BETWEEN 2015 – 2020, at 2 (2021),
https://www.stern.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/assets/documents/NYU-RAM_ESG-Paper_2021%20
Rev_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7MK-U2M5] (reporting, based on an analysis of more than 1000
empirical studies, “a positive relationship between ESG and financial performance for 58% of the
‘corporate’ studies focused on operational metrics such as ROE, ROA, or stock price with 13%
showing neutral impact, 21% mixed results (the same study finding a positive, neutral or negative
results) and only 8% showing a negative relationship”).
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discretion to do so will be protected by the business judgment rule.111 Indeed,
if consideration of stakeholder interests is necessary to maximize shareholder
value, corporate officials would be remiss for failing to afford sufficient
consideration to those interests. That corporate officials face meaningful
liability exposure for such failures is reflected in cases like Marchand.112
Concededly, the relationship between stakeholder interests and
shareholder value may be unknown or unknowable to a corporate manager at
the time of an initial decision, making it difficult for a manager to determine
the effect of a decision on shareholder value with certainty. Professor
Dorothy Lund observes that the effect may depend on considerations such as
the impact of a stakeholder-oriented decision on a corporation’s reputation
and subsequent sales, the possibility that competitors will adopt similar
policies (resulting in a level playing field), the prospect of averting more
burdensome obligations imposed through regulation, the possible changes in
supply chain practices, and more.113 Thus, a range of business decisions that
might appear to sacrifice short-term profitability may be rationally related to
long-term corporate value and within the scope of managerial discretion. The
fact that managers cannot reliably predict the economic consequences of their
operational decisions is not a characteristic unique to stakeholder-oriented
decisions, however. Indeed, it is the rationale behind the business judgment
rule.
The decision by Dick’s Sporting Goods to stop selling guns in some of
its stores following the school shooting in Parkland, Florida, illustrates this
potential uncertainty.114 Initially, the media characterized the decision as “at
the expense of revenue.”115 Dick’s CEO Edward Stack believed the company

111. Although a cynic might argue that the business judgment rule encourages corporate
officials to defend stakeholder-oriented decisions disingenuously in terms of shareholder value, we
believe for the reasons discussed infra at notes 129 through 134 and accompanying text, that
deliberate decisions to sacrifice shareholder value in the interests of other stakeholders are unlikely.
112. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 809 (Del. 2019).
113. See Lund, supra note 9, at 5, 14–15 (giving examples of the potential effects of companies’
socially responsible decisions on their competitors, suppliers and the market as a whole). Melvin
Eisenberg observed more than twenty years ago that seemingly purely altruistic corporate behavior
might nonetheless provide a benefit to the corporation. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Corporate Conduct
That Does Not Maximize Shareholder Gain: Legal Conduct, Ethical Conduct, the Penumbra Effect,
Reciprocity, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Sheep’s Clothing, Social Conduct, and Disclosure, 28
STETSON L. REV. 1, 19–20 (1998).
114. Nathaniel Meyersohn, Dick’s Sporting Goods Removes Guns and Ammo from 125 Stores,
CNN BUS. (Mar. 14, 2019, 11:27 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/14/investing/dicks-sportinggoods-guns [https://perma.cc/Z8LH-7D6T].
115. Sarah Nassauer, How Dick’s Sporting Goods Decided to Change Its Gun Policy, WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-dicks-sporting-goods-decided-to-changeits-gun-policy-1543955262 [https://perma.cc/LG3G-PC79].
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would lose a quarter of a billion dollars from the decision.116 Dick’s also
faced the prospect of boycotts and protests from gun owners.117 Stack
defended the decision as the right thing to do, saying “I don’t really care what
the financial implication is.”118 Despite this statement, no shareholder
challenged Dick’s decision, and we are skeptical that any shareholder could
do so successfully. Subsequently, it became less clear that the decision
involved a tradeoff between societal and shareholder value. Sales grew at the
stores where the company discontinued gun sales, and Dick’s removed guns
from more stores.119 A year after its initial announcement, Dick’s reported a
jump in same-store sales, and its stock price increased by more than four
percent.120 In March 2020, Dick’s announced that it would remove guns from
an additional 440 stores, and its stock price increased by thirteen percent.121
The approaches in quadrants 2 and 4, in contrast, reflect a shift from
shareholder primacy. Quadrant 4—“Power but not obligation to consider
nonshareholder interests irrespective of their effect on long-term shareholder
value”—presents the formulation of corporate purpose that is, we think, most
consistent with the view espoused by purpose advocates and is embodied in
the Business Roundtable statement. It takes the position that the
consideration of stakeholder interests is normatively desirable and legally
permissible when those interests are unrelated to or even inconsistent with
shareholder value but that this consideration is not mandatory. It further
posits that consideration of stakeholder interests may, but need not, trump
shareholder interests or the pursuit of economic value.
As noted in Part II, supra, we challenge the claim that existing corporate
law imposes a binding obligation of shareholder primacy, at least outside the
context of takeovers and self-dealing transactions. Moreover, existing black
letter law authorizes corporate officials, at least in some cases, to consider

116. Terry Nguyen, Dick’s Sporting Goods Destroyed $5 Million Worth of Guns It Pulled from
Its Stores, VOX (Oct. 8, 2019, 11:50 AM), https://www.vox.com/the-goods/2019/10/8/20904713/
dicks-destroyed-guns-5-million-dollars [https://perma.cc/U9AF-9HXQ]. Not only did Dick’s stop
selling the guns, it destroyed more than $5 million worth of guns in its inventory rather than
returning the weapons to the manufacturers. Id.
117. Rich Duprey, Will Dick’s Sporting Goods Be Hurt by a Gun Owners’ Boycott?, THE
MOTLEY FOOL (May 17, 2018, 7:12 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/retail/2018/05/
17/dicks-sporting-goods-hurt-by-gun-owners-boycott/34999931/ [https://perma.cc/QXJ5-YGMF];
Rachel Siegel, Dick’s Sporting Goods Reports Strong Earnings as It Experiments with Reducing
Gun Sales, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2019, 10:30 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
2019/08/22/dicks-sporting-goods-stock-surges-strong-nd-quarter-earnings/ [https://perma.cc/G257
-YBGL] (reporting that the decision sparked customer boycotts and employee resignations).
118. Nassauer, supra note 115.
119. Meyersohn, supra note 114.
120. Siegel, supra note 117.
121. Dick’s Sporting Goods to Stop Selling Guns at 440 Additional Stores, CBS PITTSBURGH
(Mar. 10, 2020, 12:01 PM), https://pittsburgh.cbslocal.com/2020/03/10/dicks-sporting-goods-440store-gun-sales/ [https://perma.cc/3UHB-CCRD].
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nonshareholder interests regardless of whether those interests have a
relationship to firm value. Many state statutes explicitly authorize charitable
donations, for example, irrespective of their relationship to firm economic
value.122 Similarly, constituency statutes empower but do not compel
corporate officials to consider stakeholder interests without requiring those
interests to be aligned with shareholder interests.123 Accordingly, we believe
there is a plausible argument that the version of corporate purpose reflected
in quadrant 4 is consistent with existing law as well as with the aspirations of
many purpose advocates.
The version of corporate purpose reflected in quadrant 2 goes further.124
We acknowledge that existing law does not support framing the approach in
quadrant 2 as an obligation.125 We believe, however, that corporations can
voluntarily commit in their charters to prioritize stakeholder or societal
interests and that such commitments would be legally enforceable. We have
found no examples of corporations that have done so, and, as we observed
above, the corporate purpose movement does not seem to be advocating the
widespread amendment of corporate charters.
Two additional aspects of quadrants 2 and 4 cause us concern. The first
is the vagueness of the term “consider.” The term might reflect a processbased obligation, requiring advisors to analyze stakeholder interests and
present that analysis to the board. We view such a process as potentially
valuable in that it can broaden the information available to the board. At the
same time, the obligation does not provide guidance as to how those interests
are to be weighed or prioritized. Veeva’s revised statement of purpose, for

122. Every state corporate law statute authorizes corporations to make charitable donations, and
none limits such donations to those that explicitly increase firm value. See R. Franklin Balotti &
James J. Hanks, Jr., Giving at the Office: A Reappraisal of Charitable Contributions by
Corporations, 54 BUS. LAW. 965, 970 (1999) (“These statutes are generally unrestrictive as to
amount of the contribution and its beneficiaries.”). In six states, including New York and California,
the statutes explicitly authorize such donations “irrespective of corporate benefit.” Id. at 971.
123. Indeed, several constituency statutes explicitly provide that no particular interest, including
that of the shareholders, “is to be considered ‘dominant’ or ‘controlling.’” Eric Orts, Beyond
Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 73–74
(1992) (citing statutes of Iowa, Indiana, and Pennsylvania).
124. We believe this is the version of purpose articulated in the Davos Manifesto, which seeks
to mandate that all corporations have the purpose of creating value for the benefit of all their
stakeholders. See Klaus Schwab, Davos Manifesto 2020: The Universal Purpose of a Company in
the Fourth Industrial Revolution, WORLD ECON. FORUM (Dec. 2, 2019), https://
www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/12/davos-manifesto-2020-the-universal-purpose-of-a-companyin-the-fourth-industrial-revolution/ [https://perma.cc/695E-PHQS] (“The purpose of a company is
to engage all its stakeholders in shared and sustained value creation. In creating such value, a
company serves not only its shareholders, but all its stakeholders–employees, customers, suppliers,
local communities and society at large.”).
125. We leave for future work whether it would be normatively desirable to amend state
corporation statutes to mandate such an approach.
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example, identifies the interests of customers and employees.126 But if those
interests conflict, who wins?127
Consider again the example of Dick’s. The purpose approach reflected
in these quadrants would seemingly authorize Dick’s to stop selling guns
even if gun sales were profitable.128 But requiring Dick’s to consider or even
prioritize stakeholder interests does not identify which interest should
dominate. Should Dick’s prioritize the interests of its customers who want to
buy guns or those who favor a ban? Should it prefer the interests of local
communities in reducing the likelihood of school shootings or consider the
interests of its employees who object to the ban?
These concerns may be why constituency statutes, which expressly
allow boards to consider other constituencies, do not appear to have a
tangible impact on corporate operations.129 First, there is no guidance on how
these constituencies should be considered.130 Second, the extent to which

126. Veeva Systems Inc., supra note 107.
127. We note that the pandemic has highlighted potential conflicts, not merely between
shareholders and stakeholders but among stakeholders. See, e.g., John Herrman, Amazon’s
Big Breakdown, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/
05/27/magazine/amazon-coronavirus.html?auth=login-email&login=email [https://perma.cc/U829
-ZV9J] (observing that Amazon’s “single-minded focus on [its] customers” imposes risks on its
employees). Conflicts can occur within a single stakeholder group as well. Robert Mundheim
offers a compelling hypothetical illustrating the potential conflicts. See Robert H. Mundheim,
Robert H. Mundheim - What Is the Significance of the Business Roundtable Statement on the
Purpose of a Corporation?, SALZBERG GLOB. SEMINAR NEWSLETTER (Oct. 22, 2019), https://
www.salzburgglobal.org/news/impact/article/robert-h-mundheim-what-is-the-significance-of-thebusiness-roundtable-statement-on-the-purpose-of-a-corporation
[https://perma.cc/M864-F76P]
(posing a thought experiment centered around a board’s decision to outsource production to a
foreign country and examining the factors the board should consider when allocating burdens within
stakeholder groups).
128. Professor Madison Condon offers a similar example, involving decisions by Exxon and
Chevron to curtail production with a resulting negative impact on the firms’ profitability and share
price. Madison Condon, Externalities and the Common Owner, 95 WASH. L. REV. 1, 45–47 (2020).
129. See Brian Quinn, Constituency Provisions and Intermediate Scrutiny Outside of Delaware,
M&A LAW PROF BLOG (Nov. 23, 2009), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mergers/2009/
11/unocal-duties-outside-of-delaware.html [https://perma.cc/4466-7SW2] (“These constituency
statutes don’t exactly do the work that legislators probably hoped they’d do when they were
originally passed.”). See also K.J. Martijn Cremers, Scott B. Guernsey & Simone M. Sepe,
Stakeholder Orientation and Firm Value 3 (Dec. 27, 2019) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3299889 [https://perma.cc/2UKL-4U3Z] (finding that constituency
statutes generate significant increases in shareholder value, particularly in “firms where stakeholder
investments are more relevant . . . or firms that are more innovative”).
130. See Anthony Bisconti, The Double Bottom Line: Can Constituency Statutes Protect
Socially Responsible Corporations Stuck in Revlon Land?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765, 794 (2009)
(“Constituency statutes do not provide any guidance as to the relevant weight directors should afford
to nonshareholder interests.”). The same criticism can be leveled at PBC statutes. See, e.g., Roxanne
Thorelli, Note, Providing Clarity for Standard of Conduct for Directors Within Benefit
Corporations: Requiring Priority of a Specific Public Benefit, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1749, 1765 (2017)
(observing that the Model PBC Act “does not delineate how the director should ‘consider’ the
interests of stakeholder groups or otherwise prioritize them”).
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most operational decisions implicate trade-offs among multiple
constituencies is often unknown and unknowable. Third, they do not modify
the fact that shareholders ultimately control corporate decisions through their
voting power and the capital market discipline. Critically, the term “consider”
does not mean prioritize, and, unless corporate officials are compelled to
prioritize nonshareholder interests, we are skeptical that they will do so.131
This system is not immutable. Corporate law could be revised, as per
Senator Elizabeth Warren’s proposal or the two-tiered board structure used
in Germany to require labor representation on corporate boards, thereby
increasing manager accountability to workers.132 Executive compensation
could be structured in a way that creates incentives for managers to pursue
identified stakeholder or societal objectives such as reducing a company’s
carbon footprint.133 And stakeholders could impose constraints by contract,
such as provisions in a credit agreement that restrict pollution.134
Alternative business forms such as the nonprofit and the PBC offer
greater structural support for the consideration and prioritization of
nonshareholder constituencies.135 The Sierra Club’s original purpose, for
example, as set forth in its articles of incorporation was “[t]o explore, enjoy
and render accessible the mountain regions of the Pacific Coast.”136 This
purpose was legally enforceable and involved an environmental interest.137

131. See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 108, at 98 (observing that signatories to the Business
Roundtable statement do not appear to have incorporated it into their operating behavior).
132. See generally Rudolf Buschmann, Worker Participation and Collective Bargaining in
Germany, 15 COMP. LAB. L.J. 26 (1993) (discussing the two-tiered structure of German corporate
boards); Carol D. Rasnic, Germany’s Statutory Works Councils and Employee Codetermination: A
Model for the United States?, 14 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 275 (1992) (describing German
codetermination and evaluating its potential use in the United States).
133. See Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 108, at 147–53 (providing evidence that corporate
signatories to the BRT statement are not seeking to align management compensation with
stakeholder interests through their compensation structures).
134. See Ohlrogge, supra note 49, at 52–53 (describing credit agreements that impose
environmental constraints on borrowers such as inspections or insurance).
135. Corporate governance in the nonprofit context raises a variety of issues concerning the
nonprofit’s public benefit purpose and its effect on officer and director fiduciary duties. See Thomas
Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, Punctilios and Nonprofit Corporate Governance—A
Comprehensive Look at Nonprofit Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 347, 362–63
(2012) (exploring the question of whether current nonprofit law is adequate in addressing nonprofit
directors’ accountability).
136. Articles of Incorporation (Original Version), SIERRA CLUB 1 (June 4, 1892),
https://www.sierraclub.org/articles-incorporation [https://perma.cc/AXH8-W3N4].
137. Compare this to the current purpose which is akin to the statements of corporate purpose
in for-profit charters. It reads in full:
The purposes of the Sierra Club are to explore, enjoy, and protect the wild places of
the earth; to practice and promote the responsible use of the earth’s ecosystems and
resources; to educate and enlist humanity to protect and restore the quality of the
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The stakeholders of the Sierra Club were its members, but the board of
directors was and is self-elected, replacing itself. To the extent there is an
enforcement mechanism of the Sierra Club’s mission, it comes from the
California State Attorney General which acts as an oversight mechanism for
the Sierra Club.138 But even then the well-known slack in charitable
compensation and mission creep for nonprofits limit the efficacy of this
enforcement mechanism.139 Similarly, the public benefit corporation offers
corporate participants a structure in which they can credibly commit to a
multi-stakeholder corporate purpose.140 Notably, most PBC statutes rely
exclusively on shareholders to enforce the interests of nonshareholder
stakeholders.141
We also note that even the most explicit charter-based language about
stakeholder value is framed in aspirational terms. These formulations seem
to be deliberately structured to limit their potential as legal constraints,
thereby limiting the accountability of corporate decision makers.142 For
example, Nestlé commits to “aim[ing] for long-term sustainable value

natural and human environment; and to use all lawful means to carry out these
objectives.
Articles of Incorporation (Sixth Version; Complete restatement of Articles of Incorporation),
SIERRA CLUB 3 (June 20, 1981), https://www.sierraclub.org/articles-incorporation [https://
perma.cc/W8UV-TZER].
138. The Sierra Club is organized as a nonprofit corporation under the laws of the state of
California and as such is subject to oversight by the state attorney general. See CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 5250 (1978) (“A corporation is subject at all times to examination by the Attorney General, on
behalf of the state, to ascertain the condition of its affairs and to what extent, if at all, it fails to
comply with trusts which it has assumed or has departed from the purposes for which it is formed.”).
139. See generally James J. Fishman, The Nonprofit Sector: Myths and Realities, 9 N.Y. CITY
L. REV. 303 (2006) (describing limits to oversight of nonprofits through public enforcement).
140. See, e.g., Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Managerial Duties in Social Enterprise: The Public Benefit
Corporation, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW 341, 345 (Benjamin
Means & Joseph W. Yockey eds., 2018) (explaining that public benefit corporation statutes enable
a corporation’s purpose to “include the dual purposes of pursuing pecuniary gain for investors and
pursuing a public benefit”).
141. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 367 (vesting shareholders with exclusive authority to enforce
PBC directors’ fiduciary duties); Julian Velasco, Shareholder Primacy in Benefit Corporations
(Dec. 19, 2019), in FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS IN BUSINESS (Arthur B. Laby & Jacob Hale Russell
eds.) (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 3–4), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3506824 [https://perma.cc/
JV8F-UBLM] (explaining that PBCs do not overcome shareholder primacy effectively because they
rely on shareholders to enforce their altruistic objectives).
142. Plaintiffs have attempted, in a few cases, to hold corporations accountable for such
statements under misrepresentation theories, but such efforts have been largely unsuccessful. See,
e.g., In re Sanofi Sec. Litig., 155 F. Supp. 3d 386, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (holding that statements in
Sanofi’s Corporate Social Responsibility Report about “Sanofi’s maintenance of an ‘effective
compliance organization’” and “Sanofi’s ‘efforts toward transparency, accountability, and
disclosure’ are too general to cause a reasonable investor to rely on them”); Ruiz v. Darigold, Inc.,
No. C14-1283RSL, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155384, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 31, 2014) (dismissing
claim by customers that they “relied on false assurances of ethical treatment for cows and workers
when they chose to purchase Darigold products”).
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creation.”143 The charter of Clif Bar & Co., which goes further than most,
describes its purpose as “to engage in any lawful act or activity . . . except as
its acts and activities are limited by its business model of aspiring to sustain
the viability of its brands; sustain the viability of its business; sustain the
working and living morale of its employees; sustain the community; and
sustain the planet.”144 At most, these charters commit corporations to aspire
or strive to act in a sustainable manner, but not actually to so act.
We find a similar limitation in corporations’ publicly-announced
purpose or mission statements. For example, Mastercard’s purpose manifesto
is “Connecting Everyone to Priceless Possibilities.”145 Bank of America’s
“clear purpose” is “to help make financial lives better through the power of
every connection.”146 Target’s purpose is “[t]o help all families discover the
joy of everyday life.”147 Not only is it unclear what these commitments mean,
but it is almost impossible to determine whether they are being met.
These problems highlight two difficulties inherent with trying to use
corporate purpose statements as a legally binding mechanism for effecting
operational change—they are neither concrete nor enforceable. A purpose
statement saying that a corporation will promote the interests of its workers,
unlike a minimum wage law, neither identifies the way in which worker
interests will be protected nor allows workers or a regulator to enforce those
interests.148 Moreover, the malleability of such a purpose statement increases
the enforcement challenge. This does not mean that the statement could not
result in the reallocation of resources among corporate constituencies, but we
question their potential effectiveness in doing so.
This view is consistent with observed practice. The Business
Roundtable statement “supersedes” its prior commitment to shareholder
primacy in favor of a “commitment to continue to push for an economy that

143. NESTLÉ S.A., supra note 35.
144. Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation of Clif Bar & Co., CALIFORNIA
SECRETARY OF STATE 1 (May 3, 2010), https://businesssearch.sos.ca.gov/Document/
RetrievePDF?Id=01756107-12491996 [https://perma.cc/U7PN-6FJS]. Clif Bar was advised on this
clause by Professor Richard Buxbaum, and this Article has been informed by his observations on
that process.
145. Mastercard’s
Purpose
Manifesto:
Connecting
Everyone
to
Priceless
Possibilities, MASTERCARD, https://www.mastercard.us/content/dam/public/mastercardcom/na/us/
en/documents/purpose-manifesto.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z88S-B7MK].
146. Who We Are: A Global Company with a Local Focus, BANK OF AMERICA,
https://about.bankofamerica.com/en-us/who-we-are.html#fbid=828BJJVoHIe [https://perma.cc/
XSJ9-VYM9].
147. Our Purpose & History, TARGET, https://corporate.target.com/about/purpose-history
[https://perma.cc/7N2E-3MNG].
148. It is for this reason, among others, that we believe that issues regarding risk and
externalities of the corporate form should be dealt with primarily through regulation. But see Steven
L. Schwarcz, Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1,
5 (2016) (arguing that systemically important firms should have a “public governance duty”).
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serves all Americans.”149 The signatories to this commitment include the
CEOs of Amazon, Cigna, and Chevron.150 The operations of each of these
companies appears, at least on some dimensions, to fall short of this
commitment.151 Amazon has been criticized for taking advantage of
loopholes to pay a miniscule amount of federal income taxes.152 Cigna has
been criticized for bribing insurance brokers with luxury vacations to sway
their recommendations to the employer-providers they advise.153 And
according to one source, Chevron’s ESG rating lags slightly behind the
extraction industry’s average rating.154
What, then, do these statements mean? A cynical view would
characterize them as virtue signaling, designed either as marketing tools or
to reduce the firm’s political exposure or vulnerability to regulation.
Alternatively, a corporation’s articulation of its purpose could be something
akin to a corporate New Year’s resolution—identifying an area in which the
corporation hopes to do better. Unfortunately, the analogy is likely to prove
149. BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 3.
150. Our Commitment, BUS. ROUNDTABLE, https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/
ourcommitment [https://perma.cc/32XN-QT34]. Cigna’s company profile states that it is “dedicated
to improving the health, well-being, and peace of mind of those we serve.” Company Profile,
CIGNA,
https://www.cigna.com/about-us/company-profile/
[https://perma.cc/85FN-9HKT].
“Amazon’s mission statement is[,] ‘We strive to offer our customers the lowest possible prices, the
best available selection, and the utmost convenience.’” Lawrence Gregory, Amazon.com Inc.’s
Mission Statement & Vision Statement (An Analysis), PANMORE INST. (Feb. 13, 2019), http://
panmore.com/amazon-com-inc-vision-statement-mission-statement-analysis
[https://perma.cc/
QA7N-ATQE]. Chevron’s “vision” is “to be the global energy company most admired for its
people, partnership and performance.” The Chevron Way, CHEVRON, https://
www.chevron.com/about/the-chevron-way [https://perma.cc/D4M4-AKAP] (emphasis added).
151. Some commentators advocate purpose as a tool to reduce or eliminate all corporate activity
that is socially harmful or even to go further and address broad-based societal problems. For
example, the British Academy states, “The purpose of business is to profitably solve the problems
of people and planet, and not profit from causing problems.” BRITISH ACAD., PRINCIPLES FOR
PURPOSEFUL BUSINESS 16 (2019), https://www.eticanews.it/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/futureof-the-corporation-principles-purposeful-business.pdf [https://perma.cc/8N3Z-SEUL]. Although
we are sympathetic to these objectives, we question the efficacy of achieving these ends through a
commitment to consider stakeholder interests.
152. See Matthew Gardner, From 0% to 1.2%: Amazon Lauds Its Minuscule Effective Federal
Income Tax Rate, INST. ON TAXATION & ECON. POLICY (Jan. 31, 2020), https://itep.org/from
-0-to-1-2-amazon-lauds-its-minuscule-effective-federal-income-tax-rate/ [https://perma.cc/W5AL567D] (criticizing Amazon for “beating the federal income tax code like a piñata” after its 2019
annual financial report revealed that it paid just 1.2 percent of its $13 billion in U.S. profits in federal
income taxes).
153. See ProPublica, Behind the Scenes, Health Insurers Use Cash and
Gifts to Sway Which Benefits Employers Choose, HEALTHLEADERS (Feb. 20,
2019),
https://www.healthleadersmedia.com/behind-scenes-health-insurers-use-cash-and-giftssway-which-benefits-employers-choose [https://perma.cc/U56K-B59Z] (reporting that Cigna
offered top-selling brokers five days at a luxury resort in Bermuda).
154. See Chevron Corp. CSR / ESG Ranking, CSRHUB, https://www.csrhub.com/CSR_and_
sustainability_information/Chevron-Corp [https://perma.cc/TX8U-S65A] (stating that Chevron has
lagged behind the average ESG ranking within the oil and gas extraction industry).
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true in the sense that, absent some form of legal compulsion, a corporation’s
commitment to pursue societal value is, like a New Year’s resolution, easily
made, but also easily broken.155
One response is that purpose statements are not intended to be legally
enforceable. Our analysis, however, suggests that in addition to being more
concrete, corporate purpose requires buy-in to affect operations in a
meaningful way. This highlights a critical limitation in the corporate purpose
movement. Advocates of repurposing the corporation argue that purpose has
transformative value. Indeed, some shareholder proposals, following that
argument, seek to have corporations adopt a social-minded purpose or
convert to a PBC.156 But thrusting a high-minded purpose upon a corporation
is unlikely to change behavior with which its critics disagree. Aspiring to
promote societal value will not make Philip Morris’s cigarettes safe,
Chevron’s emissions net-zero, or McDonald’s hamburgers healthy.
IV. An Instrumental View of Corporate Purpose
One might conclude, from the foregoing discussion, that we are
corporate purpose skeptics. To an extent, we are. We do not believe that
corporate purpose can be used to compel corporations to act as benevolent
social planners. Nor do we think that, by pledging their commitment to the
Business Roundtable statement, corporate CEOs will change their behavior
and pay workers higher wages, reduce their carbon footprint, or stop
manufacturing and selling hazardous products.
We do, however, believe that there is value in corporations articulating
their purpose. We argue for understanding corporate purpose from an
instrumental perspective. Corporate purpose, we claim, can be used to direct
and manage the expectancy interests of the corporation’s stakeholders.
Because a corporation is a collective enterprise, individuals and entities that
interact with it and make decisions on its behalf have different interests and
goals. Purpose allows a corporation to signal its priorities to its stakeholders,
enabling them to sort (identify interactions that are likely to further their
individual goals) and to negotiate (determine the regulatory or contractual
protections necessary to constrain corporate decisions that are inconsistent
155. Studies show that New Year’s resolutions have a failure rate of 80%, and most are broken
by February. Marla Tabaka, Most People Fail to Achieve Their New Year’s Resolution. For Success,
Choose a Word of the Year Instead, INC. (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.inc.com/marla-tabaka/whyset-yourself-up-for-failure-ditch-new-years-resolution-do-this-instead.html [https://perma.cc/RJ9N
-VD9C].
156. See Wells Fargo & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 2019 SEC NO-ACT. LEXIS 584 (Dec. 27,
2019) (reporting that the board of directors commissioned an independent study to assess the
feasibility of becoming a PBC or otherwise implementing public purpose measures “to protect the
interests of our Company’s critical stakeholders”); Tractor Supply Company, SEC No-Action
Letter, 2020 SEC NO-ACT. LEXIS 581 (Dec. 31, 2020) (requesting board take the necessary steps
to convert the corporation to a PBC).

FISCH.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

1340

7/18/2021 6:00 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 99:1309

with those goals). In addition, purpose can be used to leverage a corporation’s
comparative advantage in achieving those goals over the ability of individual
corporate participants. In short, purpose is an internal tool rather than an
external constraint like regulation. We do not argue in this Article for a
particular normative vision of corporate purpose.157
A.

Corporate Purpose as a Coordinating Device

The starting point for our instrumental approach is the recognition that
the corporation is a collective enterprise. Multiple constituencies interact
with the corporation and each has objectives that it seeks to implement
through its association with the corporation. Employees seek to maximize
their wages and improve their working conditions. Customers want a lowcost and high-quality product. Creditors want repayment of their loans with
minimal risk. The local community wants the corporation to refrain from
polluting. Society as a whole wants the corporation to operate in a sustainable
manner and to avoid exhausting the planet’s natural resources.
The interests of these constituencies may vary and even conflict.
Notably, however, the interests and preferences of individuals within each
constituency group vary as well. Some shareholders prefer short-term profit
maximization; others favor the creation of long-term sustainable value. Some
customers prioritize cost, while others care about product quality. Some
employees prefer the potential rewards of fast-paced corporate growth, while
others care about long-term job stability.
As the Supreme Court recognized, “A corporation is simply a form of
organization used by human beings to achieve desired ends.”158 People use
corporations in situations in which the corporate form offers them a
comparative advantage over individual action.159 The contractual theory
conceptualizes the corporation as a series of contracts that serve to
accommodate and coordinate the interests of corporate participants.160 We
argue that corporate purpose can serve as an implicit term within these
contracts. As such, it both enables corporate participants to have a shared
understanding among corporate participants about their rights and provides
them with clarity about those rights. As Citizens United recognized, “the
procedures of corporate democracy” allow corporate participants to

157. Similarly, we leave for future work the procedure by which a corporation should select or
modify its chosen purpose.
158. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 706 (2014).
159. The economic literature frames this in terms of the firm/market decision. See, e.g., R.H.
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. pts 1–3, at 3, 19, 33 (1988) (explaining the
role of the firm as lowering transaction costs over market-based exchanges).
160. See David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 229–31 (1990)
(providing a background on the “nexus of contracts” theory of corporations).
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coordinate their expectations and impose those expectations on corporate
decision makers.161
The scope served by an articulation of purpose can vary. A corporation’s
purpose can simply be the products or services it seeks to provide, such as
Home Depot’s purpose to supply home-improvement products. Purpose can
go further, however, and identify the values to which the corporation will
adhere, the limits on its operating practices, and the constituencies that the
corporation will consider or prioritize in its operations. It is purpose in this
sense that the Business Roundtable and Larry Fink are promoting,
distinguishing the purpose they advocate from mere mission statements.
Within this framework, maximizing shareholder economic value is one
possible purpose, and the corporate framework is, for a variety of reasons, an
efficient tool for accomplishing this objective, but it need not be the only
corporate goal. As the Supreme Court explained:
For-profit corporations, with ownership approval, support a wide
variety of charitable causes, and it is not at all uncommon for such
corporations to further humanitarian and other altruistic objectives.
Many examples come readily to mind. So long as its owners agree,
a for-profit corporation may take costly pollution-control and
energy-conservation measures that go beyond what the law
requires.162
The rationale for an expansive conception of purpose is that, notwithstanding
Milton Friedman’s reasoning, corporations may offer their participants a
comparative advantage in pursuing both economic and non-economic
objectives.163
Purpose has several advantages over traditional contracting. First, it
reduces the transaction costs of allocating rights and responsibilities among
a wide range of stakeholders, including stakeholders like society at large that
are not parties to explicit contracts nor represented in the corporation’s
decision-making structure. Second, contracts are private and are typically
accessible only by their signatories. Purpose provides a public-facing
mechanism that expands the scope of those who can hold the corporation
accountable. Thus, customers, in choosing to support corporations with fairpay practices, can learn about the corporation’s commitment to those
practices from its purpose statement. Third, a corporation’s commitment to
161. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 361–62 (2010).
162. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 712.
163. In seeking to understand why a corporation might have an advantage in pursuing a
noneconomic objective, participants in our seminar at Harvard asked why a corporation should seek
to save penguins as opposed to maximizing profits, distributing those profits to its shareholders, and
letting those shareholders save the penguins. If the corporation’s manufacturing processes are
killing penguins, however, it is likely more efficient for the corporation to change those processes
than for shareholders to attempt to resurrect the dead penguins.
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its purpose is enforceable through market forces and by market participants,
in contrast to a contract that typically does not provide third-party
beneficiaries with a cause of action for breach.164 Finally, purpose can serve
as a background or standard term that does not need to be negotiated in each
individual employment, credit, and supply contract, thereby reducing
transaction costs.165
Corporate statements about purpose or values can thus be explained as
aligning and regulating stakeholder goals. Nike’s recent campaign with Colin
Kaepernick is a way of reaching out to its consumer base to signal that its
values align with its consumers.166 Similarly, Ben & Jerry’s has pursued
stakeholder values even as a subsidiary of Unilever, the giant food
conglomerate.167
Multiple stakeholders may share similar objectives with respect to
corporate purpose, thereby deriving value from a mechanism that enables
both signaling and commitment. In addition, a stakeholder group may benefit
indirectly from the corporation’s ability to make itself more attractive to other
stakeholders. For example, statements about corporate purpose that attract
customers who share that purpose may result in higher sales, increasing value
for shareholders. In addition, a corporation’s articulated purpose of serving
customers may attract shareholders who value that objective independently
of its effect on economic value. These congruencies extend to other
stakeholder groups. Corporations publicly express their values as a method
to attract and retain the best talent for positions, particularly as the percentage
of millennial and socially conscious employees in the workforce increases.

164. See, e.g., Kishanthi Parella, Protecting Contract’s Hidden Parties, AM. BUS. L.J.
(forthcoming Jan. 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3697273 [https://
perma.cc/QK5Q-AT2M] (identifying problems in enforcing corporate contracts addressing
externalities in global supply chains).
165. There is some empirical support that this instrumental use of corporate purpose is valueenhancing. A recent study found that, although corporate purpose was not itself related to firm
financial performance, firms with a high clarity of purpose had higher stock market performance
and accounting returns. Claudine Gartenberg, Andrea Prat & George Serafeim, Corporate Purpose
and Financial Performance, 30 ORG. SCI. 1, 2 (2019).
166. See Joshua Hunt, Colin Kaepernick, Nike, and the Myth of Good and Bad Companies,
THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2018/09/nikekaepernick/569371/ [https://perma.cc/JR94-MB78] (“For Nike, Kaepernick’s cause is simply good
business—if it were anything other than a cynical branding exercise, the company would surely not
be simultaneously doing business with the NFL, which has done its best to stifle Kaepernick’s
protest movement.”).
167. See Our History, BEN & JERRY’S, https://www.benjerry.com/about-us#4timeline [https://
perma.cc/4C2P-LQZC] (explaining that the company’s structure has enabled it to retain a separate
progressive identity); Our Values, BEN & JERRY’S, https://www.benjerry.com/values [https://
perma.cc/GT6D-SFGX] (explaining that its mission is “[t]o make, distribute and sell the finest
quality ice cream and euphoric concoctions with a continued commitment to incorporating
wholesome, natural ingredients and promoting business practices that respect the Earth and the
Environment”).
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Similarly, Professors Barzuza, Curtis, and Weber have theorized corporate
social activism as an effort to recruit socially conscious millennial
investors.168
Our instrumental conception of purpose serves two distinct functions.
First, it serves a signaling function, allowing those who deal with the
corporation to identify its objectives and determine the degree of fit with their
individual goals. It enables shareholders and creditors to contribute capital
according to a set of terms that governs their rights with respect to that
contribution. It allows officers and directors to make operational decisions,
protected by settled principles of authority and process. It protects employees
with the existence of a legally responsible entity that stands behind the
decisions of individual managers. It offers customers, suppliers, and others
who deal with the corporation guidance about the history, stability, and
financial condition of the counterparty to their dealings. In short, corporate
purpose provides a framework that allocates the rights and responsibilities of
the participants in the collective enterprise that constitutes the corporation’s
business. As such, it offers a way of managing expectancy interests relevant
to the decision whether to associate with the corporation.
Second, purpose enables those who interact with the corporation to
identify the ways in which the corporation’s purpose may create a tension
with their individual goals and to navigate that tension by contract, by
regulation, or by exit. For example, a bank may want to lend money only to
businesses that are carbon neutral. If a corporation’s primary purpose is to
pursue economic value, it may not make costly operational changes that
reduce its carbon footprint. However, the lender can both demand those
changes through conditions in the loan agreement and create incentives
through the terms of the loan to induce the corporation’s agreement to those
conditions. Alternatively, the bank can refuse to lend to businesses that refuse
to meet its environmental standards.
Corporate purpose not only sets expectations; it provides measurable
standards for monitoring. ExxonMobil for example posts on its website that
its mission is “[f]ueling the world safely and responsibly.”169 The mission
statement continues for a paragraph and concludes “[we] explore for oil and
natural gas on six continents. . . . [W]hile addressing the risks of climate
change.” Regardless of the views of specific shareholders on the importance
of responding to climate change, they should reasonably demand that
ExxonMobil corporate officials report more tangible efforts to address

168. Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis & David H. Webber, Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund
ESG Activism and the New Millennial Corporate Governance, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 1243, 1249–50
(2020).
169. Who We Are, EXXONMOBIL, https://corporate.exxonmobil.com/About-us/Who-we-are
[https://perma.cc/8VYP-NUX2].
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climate change than Chevron whose “vision” is being “the global energy
company most admired for its people, partnership and performance.”170
B.

Principles for an Effective Purpose
Our instrumental conception of corporate purpose offers guidance on
how to make corporate purpose more effective. Specifically, for purpose to
provide constituents with a meaningful signal and coordinating device,
purpose must reflect a meaningful commitment. We believe that this requires
two components. First, a corporation’s purpose statement must be
sufficiently concrete that stakeholders can ascertain whether the corporation
is operating in a manner that is consistent with that purpose. We challenge
the value of corporate purpose statements that are vague, aspirational, or
cannot be evaluated by reference to publicly-available metrics.171
Second, a corporation’s purpose must be enforceable. We do not mean
to suggest that purpose statements be generally enforceable through tools
such as ultra vires or fiduciary duty litigation.172 Concrete and transparent
purpose statements are increasingly enforceable, however, through marketbased mechanisms. Customers who are attracted by a corporation’s
commitment to the welfare of its workers can sanction the corporation’s lack
of attention to working conditions in its supply chain by refusing to buy its
products. Employees can sanction corporations that do not adhere to their
environmental or social policies by working elsewhere.173 Purpose thus
extends the potential for discipline beyond the capital markets to the product
and labor markets.

170. The Chevron Way, CHEVRON, https://www.chevron.com/about/the-chevron-way
[https://perma.cc/D4M4-AKAP].
171. For an example of how this can be done, see An Update on Our Work to Serve All
Stakeholders, AIRBNB (Jan. 17, 2020), https://news.airbnb.com/serving-all-stakeholders/ [https://
perma.cc/CR4A-2ETL] (identifying five of the company’s stakeholders and releasing metrics
reporting on its success in pursing their interests).
172. Cf. Kevin M. LaCroix, Oracle Directors Hit with Derivative Suit on Board Diversity
Issues, D&O DIARY (July 6, 2020), https://www.dandodiary.com/2020/07/articles/shareholdersderivative-litigation/oracle-directors-hit-with-derivative-suit-on-board-diversity-issues/
[https://
perma.cc/JSP6-W9BB] (quoting the complaint’s allegations that Oracle “consciously failed to carry
out Oracle’s written proclamations about increasing diversity in its ranks”).
173. See, e.g., Half of Employees Won’t Work for Companies That Don’t Have Strong
CSR Commitments, SUSTAINABLE BRANDS (June 1, 2016), https://sustainablebrands.com/
read/organizational-change/half-of-employees-won-t-work-for-companies-that-don-t-have-strongcsr-commitments [https://perma.cc/9WUT-7SLJ] (noting that “51 percent [of employees] won’t
work for a company that doesn’t have strong social or environmental commitments” and that
retention of highly-transient millennials without such commitments is particularly difficult).
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Accordingly, we believe that a corporate purpose can be implemented
through structural and governance mechanisms rather than legal rules.174 A
corporation can commit to a purpose and incentivize its officials to adhere to
its contract terms,175 board composition, and structure of executive
compensation. A corporation’s identification and disclosure of tangible
metrics both reinforces its commitment to the objectives identified in its
purpose and renders its statement of purpose enforceable. We view, for
example, the pursuit of metrics to assess compliance with corporate ESG
goals as an attempt to monitor and measure corporate performance in line
with corporate purpose.176
In this regard, purpose provides a guide star and guardrails. Legal
enforcement might be rare but could police the outer limits. Within the
guardrails, purpose would be, and increasingly is, enforced through market
forces and structural and governance mechanisms.177
We recognize that corporations have yet to adopt the type of corporate
purpose we advocate. Nonetheless, we believe that if corporate purpose is to
be effective, it must be more than a mission statement, and that structural
sources can provide a source of effectiveness. Our instrumental approach
thus provides a foundation in a world where purpose is currently everywhere,
but commitment is lacking.
Conclusion
Our instrumental conception views corporate purpose as serving a
modest role—functioning to manage expectations, coordinate interests, and

174. See Edward Rock, For Whom Is the Corporation Managed in 2020?: The Debate over
Corporate Purpose 4 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 515, 2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3589951 [https://perma.cc/LL2Y-XE8X] (explaining that the
corporation’s traditional focus on shareholder primacy can be explained, in part, by the statutory
structure and the control rights that it affords to shareholders).
175. See Annie Palmer, WeWork CEO Adam Neumann Has Incentives Tied to
the Company’s Stock Value and His Charitable Donations, CNBC (Aug. 14, 2019,
1:42 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/14/wework-ceo-adam-neumann-has-incentives-tied-tostock-value-giving.html [https://perma.cc/SDD6-9Y26] (reporting that WeWork founder Adam
Neumann’s voting rights were tied to a requirement that he make a billion dollars’ worth of
charitable contributions over a 10-year period).
176. See generally Jill E. Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107 GEO. L.J.
923 (2019) (advocating that the SEC sustainability mandate reporting). Lynn LoPucki argues that
the development of an ESG information system with standardized metrics will enable the
corporations’ stakeholders to “repurpose” the corporation to service stakeholders, the environment,
and the public. Lynn M. LoPucki, Repurposing the Corporation 3 (Feb. 10, 2021) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
177. A recent paper by Mark Roe highlights how the degree of competition to which a
corporation is subject affects its ability to incorporate nonshareholder dimensions of purpose. Mark
Roe, Corporate Purpose and Corporate Competition 4 (Mar. 8, 2021) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3817788
[https://perma.cc/SVM3-BZVV]
(arguing that expanded purpose has “has greater potential to succeed if competition has declined”).
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enhance transparency and accountability. We believe that, by articulating
their purpose, corporations can identify priorities and strategic choices that
are core to their business model as well as identifying their commitment to
those choices to their stakeholders. We also view purpose as enabling
stakeholders to accomplish objectives in which operating through the
corporation is more efficient than acting in an individual capacity. The
instrumental role thus enables them to capitalize on contexts in which
corporate action offers a comparative advantage.
We argue, however, that the role of purpose is currently under-realized.
For corporate purposes to meet the objectives that we identify, they should
be articulable and enforceable. Aspirational mission statements that lack
specificity and enforcement may be useful for branding, virtue signaling, or
public relations, but they are not pragmatic tools for accomplishing the
instrumental function of corporate purpose. One solution is to specify
corporate purpose more concretely in charters. Alternatively, a corporation
can implement its purpose through structural mechanisms, including
reporting standards, compensation metrics, and board composition.
Critically, given the shareholder-centric nature of the corporation,
purpose will largely remain a structural and market construct. Within this
market, we see growing efforts to reshape corporate purpose through
increasing attention to ESG and through the use of PBCs. Notably, these
efforts are largely the product of shareholder-driven initiatives. We view
these efforts as evidence that purpose is (and can be) enforceable through
market forces. We believe that these forces are consistent with the economic
mission of the corporation by defining purpose in a manner which sets the
expectations of the corporation’s stakeholders and commits them to the
enterprise.

